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Abstract
Large-scale data collection is an increasingly prominent andBackground: 
influential feature of efforts to improve healthcare delivery, yet securing the
involvement of clinical centres and ensuring data comprehensiveness often
proves problematic. We explore how improvements in both data
submission and completion rates were achieved during a crucial period of
the evolution of two large-scale data exercises.
  As part of an evaluation of a quality improvement programme,Methods:
we conducted an ethnographic study involving 90 interviews and 47 days of
non-participant observation of two UK national clinical audits in a period
before submission of data on adherence to clinical standards became
mandatory.
Critical to the improvements in submission and completion ratesResults: 
in the two exercises were the efforts of clinical leaders to refigure “data
work” as a professionalization strategy. Using a series of strategic
manoeuvres, leaders constructed a cultural account that tied the fortunes of
the healthcare professions to the submission of high-quality data, proposing
that it would demonstrate responsibility, transparency, and alignment with
the public interest. In so doing, clinical leadership deployed tactics that
might have been seen as unwarranted managerial aggression had they
been imposed by parties external to the profession. Many residual
challenges were linked not to principled objection by clinicians, but to
mundane problems and frustrations in obtaining, recording, and submitting
data. The cultural framing of data work as a professional duty was important
to resolving its status as an abject form of labour.
Improving data quality in large-scale exercises is possible,Conclusions: 
but requires cooperation with clinical centres. Enabling professional
leadership of data work may offer some significant advantages, but
attention is also needed to mundane and highly consequential obstacles to
participation in data collection.
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Introduction
Data systematically collected across multiple settings have an 
important role in revealing unwarranted variations in health-
care practices, processes and outcomes and in identifying 
areas for improvement1–4. Purposefully designed large-scale 
exercises involving data extraction from medical records into 
standardized formats are now well-established in many health 
systems. Such exercises vary in the specifics of their design 
(for example in using census or sample methods) and go by 
different names, including registries and clinical audits. Their 
unifying feature is that they require participating clinical 
centres to prepare information on specific measures (usually 
by reviewing clinical records or prospectively establishing 
data collection systems) using standardized definitions, and 
then submit the data to a central register using a standardized 
template to enable comparison of performance5. These kinds of 
large-scale data exercises are often associated with improve-
ments over time6–9, but they are not straightforward to 
design or execute.
One challenge is that they rely for their effectiveness on the 
accuracy, reliability and completeness of the data10, yet missing 
data and variable participation rates between organizations are 
frequent problems worldwide11,12. Discrepancies, sometimes 
substantial, between what is recorded in routine medical records 
and what is reported to registries/audits are frequently found13,14. 
Efforts to improve data quality have been varied: they have 
included technological innovation based on electronic health 
records, data linkage and “big data” strategies, financial incen-
tives, and exhortations for improved accuracy. None has been 
fully effective15,16, and methods of quality assurance remain 
resource-intensive17. Means of addressing these challenges are 
much needed, but will depend on better understanding of what 
influences data completion and quality in clinical centres and 
how they may be addressed. In this article, we respond to this 
need, reporting a qualitative study of large-scale data collec-
tion using case studies of two UK national clinical audits during 
a crucial period in their evolution when they demonstrated 
improvements – though not perfection – in data completeness 
and quality.
Some context is useful. In the UK, large-scale clinical audit 
originated as an activity largely led by the medical profession. 
An early example was the monitoring of survival rates after 
cardiac surgery through voluntary submission of data to the 
Society of Cardiothoracic Surgery, which began in 1977, ini-
tially through the collection of data aggregated at the level 
of surgical units, and later through submission of patient- 
level outcome data. In the early years of many audits, participa-
tion by National Health Service (NHS) organizations, while 
widespread, was voluntary, and often depended on local pro-
fessional enthusiasm18, but audit has evolved into a large-scale 
activity organized on a national scale. Just under half (~30) of 
the current ~70 national clinical audits are operated by profes-
sional groupings (such as the royal colleges or professional 
societies) as part of a national managed scheme supported by 
government funding: the National Clinical Audit and Patient 
Outcomes Programme (NCAPOP)3. Participation in NCAPOP 
audits is now mandatory for NHS organizations, following 
the introduction of a contractual requirement in 2012.
Data from the audits are pluripotent and mobilized for many 
goals, including quality assurance, pay-for-performance 
schemes, and inspection and regulation. As a result, large-
scale audits have assumed a somewhat hybrid character: 
though mostly still led and organized by professional groups, 
they are funded by government and are part of the system’s 
performance management architecture.
The trend for appropriating audit data as a mechanism for 
external rather than internal control of professional work is 
evident globally. In the United States, for example, quality 
measures and data collection activities that originally devel-
oped within professional structures are increasingly repurposed 
as mechanisms of transparency and accountability19. However, 
the consequences of these shifts in professional ownership 
for data collection practices remain poorly understood. One 
possibility is that the apparent co-option of large-scale data 
exercises such as clinical audit might, rather than improving 
data quality, provoke professional resentment and disengage-
ment, degrade the perceived value of audit as a professional 
learning resource, and activate familiar dysfunctional effects 
of performance measurement, such as gaming of data20. Few 
studies have, however, explored this or the other influences on 
data collection and submission21.
In this article, we examine influences on data submission 
and completion by clinical centres using two large-scale UK 
clinical audits: the National Lung Cancer Audit (“the Lung 
Audit”) and the National Vascular Registry (“the Vascular 
Registry”). Both share histories characteristic of clinical audit 
in the UK more generally. Though initially founded to serve as 
voluntary intra-professional endeavours, both have increasingly 
assumed features of performance management.
The two audits
What we term the Lung Audit had its origins in 1999 in the 
efforts of an informal group supported by the Royal College of 
Physicians (RCP), itself a peer-led statutory body. The Lung 
Audit was formally established in 2004. By 2009, it had been 
implicated in the substantial improvements in clinical care 
that occurred during this period22,23, achieved by identifying 
variations and inequalities in care processes and outcomes 
and targets for improvement. Data submission was initially 
voluntary, but all NHS organizations in the UK responsible 
for diagnosing and treating patients with lung cancer were, 
from 2012 onwards, required to upload their cases under a new 
contractual requirement to contribute to NCAPOP audits.
The Vascular Registry (which has had various names) was 
initially formed in 1997 by a “few interested surgeons pooling 
data from different centres to provide a comparison of 
outcomes in vascular surgery”24. Like the Lung Audit, it has 
evolved over time, initially voluntary and becoming more 
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formalized and organized, while still led by the Vascular Soci-
ety of Great Britain and Ireland (a professional society for 
advancement of quality, training and research in vascular 
health, led by vascular surgeons themselves). Data submission 
to the audit has been mandatory since 2014 when the Registry 
entered the NCAPOP program.
In common with many large-scale data exercises, the Lung 
Audit and the Vascular Registry experienced problems with 
obtaining reliable and complete contributions of data from 
their inception. Some centres submitted high-quality, complete 
data on time; others none at all; some were inconsistent in sub-
mission or contributed data that were neither complete nor 
clean22,25. Improvements in both audits have occurred over time, 
with the most recent reports suggesting generally high com-
pletion rates, though also variability in completion of some 
fields and ongoing variation in returns between centres26,27. The 
Lung Audit, in its most recent annual report, notes recording 
of cancer stage for 95% of patients, for example, but much 
weaker completeness for others fields (e.g. performance status, 
recorded for only 76% of patients, with individual hospitals 
ranging from 0% to 100% data completeness)27. Similarly, 
the Vascular Registry’s most recent annual report reports 
case-ascertainment rates of around 90% for most procedures, 
but much lower rates for some (e.g. endovascular lower limb 
procedures, 27%), and significant variations in submission rates 
between centres26.
One way of explaining the overall improvement over time is 
simply to note that data submission, which had been volun-
tary when the audits were first launched, became mandatory 
(2014 for the Vascular Registry; 2012 for the Lung Audit). The 
Lung Audit also changed its methods of data collection in 2014, 
and in 2015 began supplementing data submitted by trusts with 
other data sources. Yet substantial improvements were occur-
ring both in submission rates and accuracy long before the 
introduction of the contractual requirement28,29, suggesting that 
mechanisms other than compulsion were at work. Further, 
the persistent variability in completion of some data fields 
suggests that neither mandating data collection nor technical 
innovation provide a full solution.
An opportunity to examine what else might explain the observed 
improvements in data collection in the audits prior to the 
mandating of data collection—and what might inhibit further 
gains—was presented by the involvement of both audits in a 
quality improvement programme. Known as Closing the Gap 
through Clinical Communities, it was organized and funded by 
the Health Foundation, a major charitable foundation. The Lung 
Audit and the Vascular Registry each participated in quality 
improvement projects in the programme, and alongside goals 
relating to improving quality of care in their clinical areas, both 
set improving quality of data submission as a key objective of 
their improvement activities. As demonstrated by their annual 
reports, both audits saw continued improvements over the 
course of the programme in both data submission and data 
quality26,27. We use our study to explore how these improve-
ments were achieved in a crucial period of the audits’ 
evolution, before data collection became mandatory.
Methods
As part of an evaluation of the Closing the Gap through Clini-
cal Communities programme (November 2009-May 2012), 
we conducted an ethnographic study involving non-participant 
observation, interviews and documentary analysis of the 
quality improvement projects linked to the Lung Audit and the 
Vascular Registry. We conducted 90 semi-structured interviews 
(45 in each project with key programme personnel and those 
involved with the programme at participating sites), as well 
as 25.5 days of observations in the lung cancer project and 
21.5 days in the vascular surgery project. Participants were 
identified through lead contacts either at the programme or the 
programme sites, and invited to take part using a package of 
materials that explained the study.
Interview prompt guides covered individuals’ roles in the 
quality improvement project, understanding of the aims of the 
project, strategies for achieving the aims, challenges antici-
pated and experienced, aspects of the project that were most 
and least successful and the factors that contributed, changes 
made to the project to respond to difficulties, unexpected 
outcomes, and what might have been done differently.
Interviews were audio-recorded, with written informed 
consent provided in advance of interviews, and transcribed 
verbatim. Fieldnotes from observations were de-briefed within 
the team, audio-recorded and transcribed. Relevant project docu-
ments, including project plans, reports and training materials, 
were also collected and analysed.
Data analysis was based on the constant comparative method30. 
The transcripts and fieldnotes were first read and reread, 
resulting in an initial broad-brush coding of all sections of 
interviews and observations relating to the collection, meas-
urement and use of data. Then, facilitated by NVivo 9 software, 
more detailed codes were iteratively developed and applied. 
This process highlighted the significance of the themes of 
the shifting ownership and purpose of the audits, and the chal-
lenges of valid data collection and submission. These themes 
informed a final analytic stage involving a more theoretical 
coding process in which these categories were further refined, 
informed by relevant theoretical and empirical literature, and 
discussed and agreed by all co-authors.
The study was given a favourable opinion by the Leicester-
shire, Northamptonshire & Rutland Research Ethics Committee 
1(10/H0406/77).
Results
Our analysis identified the importance of two influences on 
participation and completion rates and quality of data submitted 
to the two audits. The first was strategic action by profes-
sional leaders who sought to promote collective responsibility 
for the quality of care provided by their peers. The second was 
mundane interferences in collecting and submitting data.
Contributing data as the exercise of professional mandate
Professional leaders in two audits were faced with the chal-
lenge of persuading their (often reluctant – and sometimes 
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truculent) peers to cooperate with collecting and submitting 
high-quality data in a policy context that seemed increasingly 
inclined to weaponize data as a means of blaming and 
shaming31. Our analysis suggests that one major reason 
for the improvements seen in quantity and quality of data 
submission in this context was the highly purposeful efforts of 
professional leaders to refigure what we term “data work” as a 
professionalization strategy32. Leaders achieved this through 
the use of cultural framing to convince providers that full 
and authentic participation in the audit made sense and was 
“consistent with their own basic interests or identities”33, (p9) 
while also linking those interests and identities to a collective 
purpose. They therefore produced what Kieran Healy terms a 
“cultural account”34 – a set of institutionalized stories, ideas 
and values about the nature and meaning of an activity. The 
success of this approach depended on persuading peers that 
audit data was both a necessary part of clinical practice and 
a professional responsibility, and that benchmarking and 
cross-centre comparison data should – even as it restricted 
individual autonomy – be regarded as a positive develop-
ment for the profession as a collective entity. Our observations 
at events organized by the two projects found, for example, 
that leaders sought to demonstrate that collecting and submit-
ting data was fully aligned both with professional values and 
with the wider public interest. By claiming custody of those 
values, leaders sought to show that contributing data was 
not only in the interests of improvement but also consistent with a 
positive professional identity and values.
Ensuringgoodqualitydata input into that ispartofachiev-
ing consistency, so if you like, it’s about professionalizing
people’s attitudes, so the data itself is important but
actually getting people to understand that putting in
good quality data is important, and embedding that in part
oftheirdailyactivity.[VascularRegistry:projectlead]
One important tactic used by professional leaders was the delib-
erate and skilful presentation of the external pressures for 
accountability as an opportunity to strengthen internal profes-
sional mission. Leaders promoted the view that demonstrating 
their profession’s ability to conduct high-quality clinical audit 
helped (rather than hindered) efforts to retain self-governance. For 
Eliot Freidson35, this kind of control over the content of 
work and the standards that should apply to that work is a 
defining feature of professionalism. This was particularly true 
for the Vascular Registry, where the professional society was 
quite explicit in published documents and in interviews that its 
running of the audit allowed it to demonstrate both its 
professional values and commitments. Its leaders stressed 
the risk that if the profession failed to get its house in order, 
the mandate for data collection would be seized by others, 
with deleterious consequences both for the profession and 
its individual members. More positively, leaders sought 
to show how invoking the trustworthiness of professional 
groupings could help to advance professional agendas, allowing 
them to conduct their affairs in ways that were consistent with 
modern forms of governance, while also maintaining professional 
control.
CriticsarguedthatthepoorresultsforelectiveAAA[abdomi-
nal aortic aneurysm] surgery were a reason to delay the
introduction of AAA screening, since there is no point in
identifying men with an AAA unless the services to treat
them are optimal. The Department of Health was, how-
ever, reassured by the response of the VSGBI [Vascular
Society] and gave screening the go ahead36. [Extract from
document,VascularRegistry]
As part of the strategic mobilization of their peers, profes-
sional leaders also sought to convince their colleagues that 
an alternative to clinical audit – using routine administrative 
data from medical records – would most likely misrepresent 
their activity and outcomes, owing to known problems with 
these data.
The problem we have with HES [Hospital Episode
Statistics compiled using routine administrative data] is
the information was never accurate enough for making
clinical decisions. […] I did an audit on the HES system
against our own records of the lung cancer patients. […]
Therewas about 15%at one end of peoplewhowere diag-
nosed with lung cancer [on HES] that didn’t have it, and
at the other end there was 15% of people who were being
missed who had got lung cancer but had been recorded on
HESashavingsomethingelse.”[LungAudit:coordinator]
Leaders in both audits emphasised the reputational risks for 
individual sites associated with non-submission of data and 
of failure to ‘volunteer’ them for national publication. They 
pointed out that the risks accrued not just to individual sites 
but also affected the integrity and standing of the audits as a 
whole. Thus, the professional leadership sought to mobilize 
cooperation by binding the fortunes of the audit at a collective 
level to those of individual actors.
There is an urgent need for clinicians to improve
contribution to national audit. Without the ability to accu-
rately measure what we do, we are unable to describe
how we need to change, or what change we are achiev-
ing. Surgeons used to be able to say that their practicewas
good. Recent publications have given the lie to this.
National clinical audit will allow clinicians to reclaim the
right to advise patients from a clear understanding of the
quality of service that they provide. Audit needs to be a
central part of our culture. [Document extract, Vascular
Registry](p50)37
Similarly, with the Lung Audit, participants invoked arguments 
that combined appeals to improving quality of care with defence 
of professional autonomy.
[Collecting data on cancer staging is] particularly impor-
tant for this hospital and this bit of the world because we
always have low surgery rates and low rates of radical
treatment, and the argument is that the reason we have
that is because our patients present much later and they’re
much sicker. But you have to have evidence to support
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that otherwise people think you’re just not doing a
verygoodjob.[LungAudit:respiratoryphysician]
Despite some initial resistance and criticism of the push for bet-
ter data on the part of the clinical centres, improvements did 
occur. In the Vascular Registry, for example, the rate of sub-
missions nationally increased from 380/month to 475/month 
over the period of the quality improvement project (similar data 
in this form are not available for the Lung Audit). In both 
the vascular and the lung cancer communities, it became 
broadly acknowledged that failure to produce credible data 
could result in unwarranted perceptions of weak performance 
both collectively and individually.
Well, from a purely selfish point of view, as we have
good results, I like to let the world know we have good
results. On the other hand, it’s also good to feed our
results into the National Vascular Database so that they
can show the world that we have good results. [Vascular
Registry:hospital-basedvascularsurgeon]
For vascular surgeons, the perceived value was profoundly 
influenced by the wider context. They accepted that it was 
inevitable that their data would be made public (by centre if not 
by surgeon), in part because it had already happened in other, 
closely related areas of surgery (cardiac surgery, for exam-
ple), and in part because the policy context meant doing the data 
work was essential to gaining recognition as an accredited cen-
tre for AAA screening. Producing the data – and demonstrat-
ing the quality of the service provided – was thus presented 
by leaders, and eventually became widely understood locally, 
as an indispensable task. Local and national contexts were 
highly interdependent in this sense, with implications for 
professionalism and the professionalization of data entry. 
Thus, while the coercive pressure associated with performance 
management was not unimportant, it was the combination 
of this with the sense of professional direction that seemed to 
be especially powerful in motivating action at the level of the 
contributing centres.
The two things that are driving us is that to be a screening
unit we have to do it, and then this central push from the
VascularSociety.[VascularRegistry:vascularsurgeon]
Critical to establishing this cultural account of clinical audit 
was the legitimacy that the professional leadership “breathed”38 
into the enterprise. This feature also enabled the leader-
ship to deploy tactics to encourage better data submission 
that might otherwise have been resisted as illegitimate mana-
gerialist aggression. For example, both audits began to use 
“traffic light” systems to classify contributing organizations. 
In vascular surgery, centres were rated against criteria includ-
ing data completeness and coding errors, with the information 
reported quarterly to senior administrators at each organization39. 
The Lung Audit similarly classified centres on their data 
contribution and the achievement of specific targets. But those 
leading the audits also restrained themselves from applying 
too much of a hard edge:
We’re pushing but actually, you can push too hard, you
can be too assertive, you can be too didactic and what
you’ll do, you’ll do a number of things: you’ll put peo-
ple’s backs up, so you’ll get disengagement; you will miss
things that are important because you’re too busy focused
ontheroadandnotabletolookupandjustlookaroundand
pause.[VascularRegistry:clinicallead]
To the extent that they maintained professional autonomy at 
the collective level, and operated through modes such as peer 
influence and top-down pressure within professions, such tac-
tics were by-and-large accepted by the participating sites. 
Persuasive tactics on the part of professional leaders were 
important in producing this broad cultural frame. But also 
vital to ensuring that the audits were not rejected in clinical 
centres as blunt tools of national accountability was further 
creative and skilful work by local actors to present data work 
as an instrument for improving local practice, including bet-
ter understanding of the relationship between care processes 
and patient outcomes, and challenging colleagues who had 
previously been intransigent to efforts to change their behaviour.
I spent hours going through it all, and our surgical rate’s
dropped to 7% and that’s well below the national aver-
age [in the Lung Audit] and I wanted to know why. So
that’s the other thing I’ve been doing, is going through
all the patients to work out why, and it turns out that
actually having the performance status and the staging has
made a massive difference. [Lung Audit: hospital-based
respiratoryphysician]
I went and looked at every aneurysm that had been oper-
ated on, to see if they’d had the traffic light forms filled
in, to see if they’d been discussed at an MDT, to see
if they’d been seen by an anaesthetist and that kind of
thing. And the results were fairly poor. [...] Whereas now
we’ve got an anaesthetic pre-assessment, every patient is
discussed at the MDT. So I think when we first did the
audit,becausetheresultsweresopoor, that’swhenwewere
like, “What is our priority here and how can we do it”?
[VascularRegistry:hospital-basedvascularsurgeon]
The mundane troubles of data collection
Though improvements in rates of contributions of data to the 
audits occurred throughout our study, variability between clini-
cal centres remained: the cultural account of clinical audit as 
a valuable activity linked to professional interests and local 
gains was not always enough to achieve the improvements in 
data quality that audit leaderships sought. To secure the supply 
of data also required addressing the troubles of data collection.
Some of the trouble lay in ongoing fault-finding among 
professional peers about the work of data, including, in 
particular, the data fields they were asked to complete: some 
were seen to lack clinical value, while the omission of oth-
ers was said to result in the neglect of important aspects of 
practice. This was a problem anticipated by Garfinkel’s argu-
ment that the categories provided to clinicians as rules to report 
Page 6 of 11
Wellcome Open Research 2019, 4:203 Last updated: 05 JAN 2020
their clinical practice may “distort the reality” of that practice so 
that clinicians may “resent it or otherwise suffer it”40 (p196).
[She] says, “The boxes aren’t the kind of boxes that you
want.” And the oncologist, he says the same thing: “This
formwasn’t designed by a clinician because they aren’t the
boxesyouwouldlike.”[LungAudit:observation]
Whether you see the patient’s relatives or not, it’s never
been counted and published […] I think it is wrong.
[LungAudit:respiratoryphysician]
A second trouble was more mundane in character, but more 
consequential in terms of its impact on rate of data collec-
tion and quality of data: the tedious, time-consuming and exas-
perating nature of the tasks of extracting the requisite data 
and then inputting them in the correct form for the relevant 
audit. At the clinical centres, participants reported numerous 
practical obstacles to the tasks of data work. The information 
required to complete the data fields for the audits was 
typically held in other, usually incompatible systems, so that 
participants had first to access and process information into 
a suitable format before they could even begin data entry. 
Participants reported an excess of data forms and fields, and 
complained that the same data had to be entered more than once 
for different purposes. The data-entry forms were reported to 
be poorly designed or difficult to use, but “upgrades” caused 
further frustration by requiring users to learn new systems. 
The within-organization technological support available for 
these systems was poor; IT malfunctions were frequent and 
not easily recoverable. The extraction and assembly of the 
information could not always be completed in time for the 
data entry schedule set externally by the audit. These mun-
dane obstacles had a powerful impact on clinicians’ ability and 
willingness to complete data entry.
If I do a carotid endarterectomy operation then I’ve got
the online [Vascular Registry] to fill out, I’ve got a local
form to fill out. I’ve often got research paperwork to fill
out, I’ve got to write an operating note, and all that can
actually take possibly anything in excess of 30 minutes
to do all that – and I actually probably only have about
20 minutes between cases sometimes, so it’s actually quite
alogisticalproblem.[VascularRegistry:vascularsurgeon]
The [completion rate at our centre] is appalling appar-
ently, which is just daft, you know, because it’s just input-
ting onto computers. […] We do all the difficult bit, we
do the diagnosis and we do, you know, the performance
data, andwe do the staging, but actually just loading it up
to[theLungAudit]?Iknowwhypeopledon’twant todo it,
becauseit’sdullandit’sboring.[Lungaudit:radiologist]
In consequence, a major strategy for both projects was provi-
sion of technical support for data collection, entry, and upload-
ing. This was instrumental in securing the improvement in the 
rates of contribution that occurred over both projects, though in 
neither case did it resolve problems of data submission entirely.
Mundane interferences – rather than objections on the basis 
of grand principle – continued to frustrate the collection of 
data, but a crucial challenge was to address the status of data 
collection as a form of what Hughes terms “dirty work”41. 
Data entry was very rarely built into job specifications or 
organizational charts in the clinical centres, and rarely was it 
an activity that was directly funded or resourced by organiza-
tions. It was thus susceptible to being seen as a discretionary or 
voluntary activity that was left undone, or fell either to lone 
enthusiasts or to (sometimes resentful) conscripts.
Collectively, yes of course it’s important because it’s a
countrywide initiative. […]Collecting data is how you then
plan forwards, but, and I think that’s the disconnect people
have: we have nobody putting data in at all (laughs)
unless they’re doing it from the goodness of their hearts.
[LungAudit:respiratoryphysician]
Some of the deeper troubles lay in the status of data work as 
a professional activity, a trouble that Harold Garfinkel antici-
pated when he noted that professional personnel may question 
whether record-keeping constitutes “a respectable thing for them 
to be doing from their point of view” (p194). Highly qualified 
clinical staff often felt that data collection and input for clini-
cal audits was a menial, tedious task that distracted from the 
real work of caring for patients. Again, objections were not 
directed at the principle of audit or its value, nor were they 
usually linked to anxieties about how the data might be used: 
rather, it was the practical business of the doing of it that 
was the trouble.
We’ve got our own surgical practitioner who does [the
data entry] […] except it’s not really his job to be doing
all the data entering, it’s his job to be helping teams look
afterpatients.[VascularRegistry:vascularsurgeon]
Why [are they] sat here doing this boring menial task,
when—particularly some of the highly specialist lung
cancernurses—theyshouldbeseeingpatients?Yetobviously
I understand the greater good of the national data andwhy
it’simportant.[LungAudit:radiologist]
In the sites we observed, the job of data entry tended to set-
tle on someone who was lower down in the hierarchy 
and less able to resist the imposition of the task. These 
individuals included the multi-disciplinary team (MDT) coor-
dinators, who were typically administrative staff, with the task 
constructed as largely a clerical one.
So everyone says ‘well I’m too busy, I can’t do that’. But
everyone says that and to be honest,with us, a lot of it has
fallen down to the coordinator to collect it. [Lung Audit:
cancerservicemanager]
The approach of allowing the task to fall to the lowest level 
of the organizational hierarchy was, however, problematic. 
Preparing complex clinical data for submission to the audits 
required judgment and no small amount of clinical knowledge.
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There’s often a lack of understanding that, you know,
they can pay people peanuts or the lowest grade to
do this kind of work and whilst maybe that might be
possible for some, there’s clearly got to be people with
more specialist knowledge involved in directing them to
dotherightthing.[LungAudit:oncologist]
In some centres, the realization grew that pushing the task of 
data entry too far down could have negative consequences for 
physicians and others senior in the hierarchy: their perform-
ance (and that of their centre) might be misrepresented by 
poor-quality data, and accordingly the quality of their care 
could be easily underestimated by external authorities and peers.
[The audit sayswe are] below the target for giving chemo-
therapy in small-cell patients, just under the target, but
then of course, you’ve got to look at the numbers. The
headache is they realize that actually they haven’t sent
the right data in. If the data had been right in the first
place, it meant that we were actually above the national
target. […] I think what’s clear is that, you know, rubbish
in,rubbishout,really.[LungAudit:oncologist]
TheMDTcoordinator (…)hadn’tadded thatbitonbecause
she didn’t understand the importance of the squamous-
cell carcinoma bit. Once I’d amended that, I think our
NOS [‘not otherwise specified’ tumours] rate for last year
was only about 10%, which is quite different from how
we’d historically been documented, and so I think quite a
lot of that is data entry and inaccuracy, rather than poor
histopathology.[LungAudit:respiratoryphysician]
The professional leadership of the audits deployed a number 
of tactics to help bolster the status of what appeared to be dirty 
work. This included more cultural framing work, characterizing 
data entry as a professional duty governed by professional values.
The difference between good and bad practice is accept-
ance that data entry is part of your job. [Vascular
Registry:coreprojectteammember]
A second tactic was the encouragement of a team-based 
approach to data entry. The Vascular Registry had originally 
depended on surgeons entering data, usually by inputting to an 
online database shortly after a surgical procedure, but a team 
approach to data entry, including nurses and anaesthetists, 
emerged39. In seeking to promote collective professional 
responsibility for data entry, the Lung Audit went further, and 
encouraged what it termed “live” data entry during MDT meet-
ings. Here, the data were entered directly onto the electronic 
database (often projected onto a screen visible to all team 
members) during team-based discussions of patients aimed at 
reviewing their cases and planning their care23. At sites where 
live data collection worked well, some local actors capitalized 
on the opportunity to use the technology to improve the flow of 
meetings, make them more ordered and dialogical, engage all 
team members, and enhance the quality of decision-making. 
Done well, live data capture helped to refigure data entry as a 
higher-status professional activity – and in the process secure 
accurate, timely, complete data collection.
It is much easier if it’s one of the medics doing [the live
data entry], because they understand the medical terminol-
ogy really in a more appropriate way. (…) If [a doctor in
training] sits at the back it just washes over them, whereas
if one of them’s having to type it in, they’re having to say,
“What exactly is the staging, what exactly have we said
hereistheplan?”[LungAudit:cancernursespecialist]
Discussion
Our analysis of how the data are produced for two large-scale 
data exercises during an interesting period in their develop-
ment reveals much about the forces at work in contemporary 
healthcare, including the enduring role and place of profes-
sionalism, the importance of the politics of professional identity 
in securing change, and the need for renewed attention to the 
mundane interferences in the achievement of quality improve-
ment goals. The improvements seen in data submission and 
quality in the two audits during the period we studied, prior to 
mandatory data collection in either field, were not achieved by 
defeated professionals subjecting themselves to invasive exer-
cises because they had no choice. Instead, it was their profes-
sionally founded character that helped to secure legitimacy and, 
ultimately, cooperation in the clinical centres. This was achieved 
by determined strategic action on the part of entrepreneurial 
and well-respected leaders within the professions: the move 
towards increased transparency and external accountability was 
managed in ways that preserved a sense of professional con-
trol and ownership, rather than provoking hostility to external 
intrusion, though the skilful creation of a cultural account34 of 
data work. The national-level policy context, and experiences 
in neighbouring clinical specialities, was important. Much pol-
icy-level work was going on both front-stage and backstage 
to improve data collection, and to signal that mandatory data 
collection was on the cards, but leaders of the Lung Audit and 
the Vascular Registry also sought to convince their peers that this 
was a professional obligation, not merely an external account-
ability requiring nominal compliance. This mission largely 
successfully achieved, what stood in the way was not princi-
pled objection but the mundane frustrations of getting the tasks 
associated with data collection and entry done. Again, the 
cultural framing of the activity as a professional duty was 
important to helping to resolve its status as an abject form 
of labour. These findings have important implications for 
other large-scale data exercises, registries, audits and other 
efforts to create learning health systems to achieve optimal 
outcomes for patients42.
One way of understanding the turn towards clinical audit as 
a tool of performance management is to see it as an erosion 
of professional mandate, in Everett C. Hughes’ sense of the 
ability “to define – not merely for themselves, but for 
others as well – proper conduct with respect to the matters 
concerned in their work” (p287)43. The increasing penetra-
tion of accountability tropes into audit might be hypothesized to 
provoke resistance and hostility by undermining the collegial 
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principles thought to be critical to the organization and 
experience of professional work44,45. A key achievement of 
the professional leaders in our study was that of persuading 
local clinicians of the importance of collecting and reporting 
data on quality. They did this in part by appealing to 
professional values of patient care, and in part by appealing to 
perhaps less noble (though not ignoble) self-interests, including, 
for example, enhanced professional legitimacy and retention of 
a measure of control. A key strength of the cultural account thus 
created was that professional leaders were then able to use tough 
tactics that might have been unpalatable had they come from 
those outside the professional peer group. These findings sug-
gest that professionalizing strategies may have an impor-
tant role as a means of encouraging commitment to quality 
and safety efforts. Though sociologists and others have often 
been sceptical of professional claims that seem aimed at 
aggrandizement and territory-claiming, more recent work 
has pointed to the benefits of maintaining a “third logic” of 
professionalism46,47 – one that retains a measure of control over 
work. Importantly, this is not the individual-level autonomy 
of old, but professional autonomy at a collective level48.
More broadly, our findings point to the increasing interpen-
etration of two once quite distinct logics: professionalism and 
managerialism. The increasingly managerial uses to which the 
two professionally-founded audits were being put might perhaps 
be understood as a colonization of professional territory by 
management, but recent contributions49,50 caution against such a 
straightforward analysis. This work points instead to the emer-
gence of managerial-professional hybrids that should be seen 
as neither managerial colonization (hegemony) nor professional 
co-optation (resistance)49. We see our study as offering some 
empirical support for this proposition, particularly in its 
finding of local creativity in use of data and technology for 
professionally led change interacted with the national-level 
movement towards transparency.
For those seeking to create and sustain learning health systems, 
the practical lesson is that allowing professional communi-
ties more influence over their own destinies, rather than insist-
ing on external oversight and accountability, may be a more 
effective long-term strategy for authentic cooperation than 
unenthused or aggrieved compliance51. Among other things, this 
means that naming, shaming and blaming by external parties52 
is likely to be counterproductive. Such activities, where 
they seem necessary, may be best done within a peer-led 
community.
A second lesson for those seeking to conduct large-scale data 
exercises for improvement lies in our identification of the 
mundane as a source of trouble. The effort required to produce 
audit data in the required format, and the lower professional 
status of those tasked with doing it, had potential to hamper data 
collection for audits. The wearisome nature of the tasks of 
data work were, in many ways, a much more potent barrier 
than grand protests about demands for external accountability. 
These tasks were a form of what Hughes terms “dirty work”: the 
kind of stigmatized work that “wounds one’s dignity” (p49)41. 
Roles at work may be played out in ways that involve a “chronic 
fight for status” (p53)41, such that, particularly in medical set-
tings, dirty work is often the subject of attempts to “roll” it 
downhill to lower-status occupations53. But if rolled too far 
down, to those unqualified in interpretation, it risked the 
reputations of those higher up who sought to keep their hands 
clean. The solutions found in these projects relied on high-
lighting the reputational risks and conferring new dignity on 
the tasks, refiguring data collection as a professional duty, and 
creating structures to support collective responsibility for the 
tasks. Though these strategies were successful in some sites, 
more institutional support for data tasks is likely to be neces-
sary for long-term success. It is perhaps of note that the Lung 
Audit’s most recent annual report27 proposes that “all lung 
cancer MDTs should appoint a ‘clinical data lead’ with 
protected time to allow promotion of data quality, govern-
ance and QI [Quality Improvement]”: the need to promote 
the value of data, and ensure recognition and status for those 
administering it, remains a crucial task for those seeking to 
maximize the quality and thus the utility of audits.
Our study does have some limitations. It is a study of two UK 
audits only, and the findings may not be generalizable to other 
settings. The findings apply to a particular period in the evolu-
tion of the audits: one that offered a particularly interesting win-
dow on non-mandatory data collection, but perhaps one with 
some unusual features, including the prospect of mandatory 
data collection in the near future. Nevertheless, increased 
use of audits, disease registries and other large-scale data 
exercises for monitoring and improving quality of care is 
an international phenomenon, and it is plausible that similar 
challenges of professional alignment, mundane technical 
challenge, and division of labour will beset programmes in 
other national contexts.
Our findings thus have important implications for large-scale 
data collection as the effort to create learning health systems 
accelerates. Professionally-led activities may offer some sig-
nificant advantages, and the consequences of mundane obstacles 
to participation in data collection should be recognized and 
managed as early as possible.
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